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*William J. Casey*

## Oversight 'Has Gone Seriously Awry'

Dear Senator Durenberger:

When Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community is conducted off-the-cuff through the news media and involves the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods, not to mention unsubstantiated appraisals of performance, it is time to acknowledge that the process has gone seriously awry.

Your remarks to the press as cited in The Washington Post and other newspapers on 14 November are the most recent example. I am dismayed by your comments regarding our alleged "failure to understand the Soviet Union," particularly in light of the fact that this is the first time you have expressed such concern over our work in this area. Recently the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board examined intelligence support to arms control. In his report, Henry Kissinger, who has led this effort, stated, "these analyses are far better than anything I saw on the subject when I was in government."

Your alleged comments that we do not consider in longer range evaluations brewing crises such as the Philippines, the rise of Shiite Muslim fundamentalism or the energy problem are tragically wrong. These are all areas where the Intelligence Community has produced an enormous number of long range studies over the last six years or more and where we have been far out in front. Your remarks betray a lack of familiarity with the many intelligence studies in the SSCI vault.

Your views on the quality of our work in all of these areas are directly contradicted by statements you and a number of other members of the Committee have made privately about the high quality of our work generally and on these problems in particular. I can only wonder at the contrast between what you say to us privately and what you say to the news media.

Not only have we not heard such criticism from you before, but such hearings as the SSCI has held on these issues

certainly would not substantiate your remarks. Neither I nor my associates are aware of specific criticism from the Committee of work that we have done in these areas.

One of the reasons I have supported your request for a national intelligence strategy is that I want to codify for the committee in one document the long range planning papers from which we now work and have been for years. I hope this will focus the oversight committees on the substantive and longer range challenges posed to the Intelligence Community rather than events in the current day headlines. This process has, of course, been briefed to the Committee piecemeal over the years and maybe there is not a full understanding of it.

Your comments are disturbing not only because they are unfounded, so different from what you and members of the Committee tell us privately, and shared with the news media instead of with us but, more importantly, because of their disheartening impact on our officers overseas and at home. What are they to think when the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee offhandedly, publicly and inaccurately disparages their work?

I have heard from your staff today and on previous occasions that you didn't really say what you were quoted as saying. That's not the point. Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable.

As we have discussed many times, if the oversight process is to work at all it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers. The cost in compromise of sources, damaged morale, and the effect on our overall capabilities is simply too high.

We have some recommendations which we are prepared to present to your Committee in closed session.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CASEY  
Director of Central Intelligence

*William J. Casey*

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WILLIAM J. CASEY  
Director of Central Intelligence

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A20.

WASHINGTON POST  
20 November 1985

## *Sam Zagoria* **Durenberger, Casey and The Post**

Consider the ingredients: Thirty journalists quizzing the head of the Senate intelligence committee about the Central Intelligence Agency and its fiery director, William J. Casey, at a time when it is a target for the handling of a prize KGB defector and the leakage of plans for toppling Muammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya.

Add to that a speaker, Sen. Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.), who has had his innings with Mr. Casey before, but who is obviously seeking this time to temper criticism with praise. Relaxed by generous food and good company, the Senate chairman takes on inquiries spanning the world and occasionally

### **Ombudsman**

peppers a response with a touch of inside humor.

Reporters busy with their tape recorders and note pads wonder if there is an underlying message in all of this. Post reporter David Ottaway, long-time foreign correspondent and now national security reporter, decided it all added up to serious criticism of the CIA and Mr. Casey. His front-page story last Thursday kicked off a week-end of attacks and counterattacks, and The Post's reporting was not out of the line of fire.

Sen. Durenberger protested vigorously Thursday that he had been dealt with unfairly and inaccurately, that he had not criticized Mr. Casey nor urged his downgrading. Actually Mr. Ottaway's third paragraph and the accompanying picture caption had noted his defense of Mr. Casey as a "professional" and "a darn good guy in the job."

On Friday, Mr. Ottaway reported Mr. Casey's free-swinging response to the Durenberger story and Mr. Casey's new charges that the senator's oversight activity had resulted in "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods." Tucked way back in the page 1 story, so far back it was in the continuation on page 33, was a correction of a statement about possible CIA legislation which appeared in the first-day report. However, there was no backing away from The Post statements on Durenberger's criticism of CIA and Casey. (Usually corrections appear in a box on page 2 or 3.)

On Saturday, Mr. Ottaway reported that Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the ranking Democrat on the committee, responding to the Casey counter-attack, felt Mr. Casey was really seeking a return to "the good old days" when there was no congressional oversight of CIA covert operations.

The partial correction Friday left Sen. Durenberger still unhappy. "The paper did the absolute minimum to clarify and correct—despite its admission of error—and I would have expected more." On Sunday, his op-ed page article appeared, putting aside the issue of Post culpability and arguing the case for congressional oversight and public discussion of CIA performance.

When I discussed the brouhaha Friday with Robert Kaiser, assistant managing editor for national news, he said the report was "solid," other than the correction and added that the reporter had taped the luncheon. I listened to the lengthy tape, read a tape transcript, talked with four other reporters who attended, discussed the reports with Mr. Ottaway, and concluded that covering a wide-ranging luncheon with a cautious legislator can be hazardous to journalistic health.

Mr. Ottaway's report could be supported by snips and snaps in the transcript, but Sen. Durenberger's string of compliments for Mr. Casey and the vagueness of his suggestions for possible change by the end of 1986 should have discouraged treating the story so one-sidedly. Sure, the kind words about Mr. Casey were in the third paragraph, but not in the lead, not in the headline.

Leads and headlines have a tendency to simplify and polarize positions, and this happened here. The result has been a four-day battle in The Post, and I doubt that it was intended by the three public officials. What started out as a low-key discussion about relationships between a key senator and an agency escalated into a shouting match, and some of the most surprised were the senator and some of his auditors.

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WASHINGTON POST  
 15 November 1985

# Casey Accuses Durenberger Of Compromising CIA

By Patrick E. Tyler  
 and David B. Ottaway  
 Washington Post Staff Writers

CIA Director William J. Casey issued a public letter last night attacking the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for conducting intelligence oversight "off the cuff" in a manner that has resulted in the "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The letter, addressed to Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), said, "It is time to acknowledge that the [oversight] process has gone seriously awry" and accused Durenberger of undercutting the morale of CIA officers around the world. "What are they to think when the chairman of the Senate Select Committee offhandedly, publicly and inaccurately disparages their work?" Casey asked.

Casey's letter referred to a report in yesterday's Washington Post in which Durenberger was quoted as charging that the CIA lacked "a sense of direction" and an adequate knowledge of long-range trends in the Soviet Union.

"I can only wonder," Casey said, "at the contrast between what you say to us privately and what you say to the news media."

In response to Casey's letter, Durenberger said last night, "An issue has been created where none exists. I continue to fully support Director Casey and the intelligence community, both privately and publicly, and I'm confident that we can continue working toward our long-range goals, to achieve both effective congressional oversight and a comprehensive national intelligence strategy."

At a meeting with reporters Wednesday, Durenberger both praised and criticized Casey and the CIA in extended remarks. Though there was no discussion of the sensitive sources and methods Casey complained of, Casey has contended that the "the Hill leaks everything" about sensitive and covert intelligence operations proposed or underway.

Among Durenberger's chief criticisms of the agency's leadership was an allegation that CIA analysts "aren't being told what it is we need [to know] about the Soviet Union." He also criticized the agency's assessment of the South African situation, saying there was a "vacuum" of independent information and that the agency was relying too heavily on State Department views.

Durenberger claimed the intelligence process prevented CIA analysts from "look[ing] five years down the road" or taking into account brewing problems such as Shiite fundamentalism in the Middle East and political deterioration in the Philippines.

Casey called these criticisms of the agency he has headed for five years "tragically wrong."

"Your remarks betray a lack of familiarity with the many intelligence studies in the [committee's] vault," Casey said.

The CIA chief added, "The intelligence community has produced an enormous number of long-range studies over the last six years or more and where we have been far out in front."

Earlier in the day, Durenberger, in a letter and a meeting with wire service reporters, sought to clarify his Wednesday remarks, which had included an off-hand prediction that support for Casey among senators on the committee would divide 8 to 7 if put to a vote.

"I think Bill is as good a DCI [director of central intelligence] as we've had in a long time, and that forgives a whole lot of things by saying that," Durenberger said to reporters Wednesday, adding, "It

would be an 8-to-7 vote on the committee if I put it to a vote."

The committee consists of eight Republicans and seven Democrats.

In Durenberger's clarifying letter yesterday, he said, "Our committee has no plans for such a vote nor, to my knowledge, are we split on any issue strictly along party lines."

Durenberger was incorrectly quoted in The Washington Post Wednesday as saying that he would recommend "legislation" downgrading Casey's job. Durenberger actually said he would consider a "recommendation" that restricted Casey to professional intelligence work with no policy formulation role.

"I did not state that the Intelligence Committee is considering recommending legislation which would substantially downgrade the CIA director's role. Our committee is not considering such legislation," Durenberger said.

Casey, noting that Durenberger had made attempts to clarify his remarks during the day, said last night, "That's not the point."

"Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable," Casey said. "As we have discussed many times, if the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers. The cost in compromise of sources, damaged morale and the effect on our overall capabilities is simply too high."

*"Public discussion  
 of sensitive  
 information ... is  
 always damaging."*

—CIA Director William J. Casey

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WASHINGTON POST  
14 November 1985

# CIA, Casey Criticized by Hill Chairman

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, yesterday criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William J. Casey, for lacking a "sense of direction" and particularly for failure to understand the Soviet Union.

Durenberger said his committee will consider recommending legislation that would substantially downgrade the CIA director's role and make the president's national security affairs adviser responsible for evaluating intelligence in the policy-making process.

His criticisms notwithstanding, Durenberger also defended Casey as a "professional" and "a darn good guy in that job" who deserved to continue as director.

Durenberger said, however, that a vote today in his Republican-dominated committee over whether to recommend Casey's dismissal in the wake of the CIA's handling of the Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko would be 8 to 7 in support of the director, a vote reflecting party lines.

Yurchenko defected to the West in August, but three months later apparently changed his mind and publicly denounced the CIA as kidnapers and torturers before returning to Moscow last week.

Durenberger's comments during a luncheon with reporters indicated that the Yurchenko affair has brought to a head serious differences between Congress and the CIA over the performance of both bodies in a series of recent disclosures of classified information.

He also acknowledged that his own attempt to redefine his committee's oversight role to encourage the public release of more information had created "an uncomfortable feeling" in Congress and "other places" about the wisdom of "that kind of course of action."

Durenberger centered his criticisms of the CIA's leadership on what he called its failure to provide overall guidelines to employees in gathering and analyzing information, particularly data regarding the Soviet Union.

"They aren't getting any sense of direction. They aren't being told what it is in the long run we need [to know] about the Soviet Union," he said.

Durenberger said he was not faulting the quality of CIA personnel or the agency's resources. Rather, he lambasted "a process that doesn't let them look five years down the road" or allow the agency to consider in their longer-range evaluations such brewing crises as the Philippines, the rise of Shiite Moslem fundamentalism in the Middle East or what he called "the energy factor."


He faulted the absence of any "sense of a national intelligence strategy," a problem he said his committee was hoping to remedy by providing additional CIA funds beginning this fiscal year.

Durenberger said another problem facing the intelligence community is a redefinition of the respective roles of the CIA and the National Security Council.

The Senate intelligence committee probably will recommend before the end of 1986 that the president's national security affairs adviser "ought to be really the person who is responsible for the linkage between intelligence and policy," while the CIA director is restricted to "professional intelligence work." Casey, who was Reagan's campaign director in 1980, has been a close adviser to the president.

The senator also disclosed that he is drafting a letter to Casey in the wake of Yurchenko asking for information on how the defection was handled, what the CIA and others have learned from the affair and who in the agency is accountable.

Durenberger said that 50 percent of past Soviet defectors had returned home as Yurchenko did in a "relatively short period of time." The senator said it was important for the CIA and the Congress to un-



SEN. DAVID F. DURENBERGER  
... defends Casey as "professional"

derstand the phenomenon if the United States hoped to encourage other Soviets to defect.

The senator also defended Congress against administration charges that it had been responsible for various "leaks" about Yurchenko's defection. He said the administration had been guilty of "selective leaking" during the three months Yurchenko was in U.S. custody.

WASHINGTON POST  
16 November 1985

# Leahy Joins Durenberger in Criticizing CIA

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Vt.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, accused the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday of "yearning to go back to the good old days" when Congress had no oversight of CIA covert operations and the United States had made "some of the most colossal failures, intelligence failures, ever."

Leahy's comments were the latest salvo in an acerbic exchange this week between Senate intelligence committee leaders and CIA Director William J. Casey.

On Wednesday, Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.) criticized Casey for not providing the CIA with a "sense of direction."

Casey, in turn, accused Durenberger on Thursday of conducting intelligence oversight in an "off the cuff" manner that had involved "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The unusual public acrimony reflects a crisis of confidence between the Reagan administration and the Congress over who is to blame for a recent spate of unauthorized intelligence disclosures.

It also has raised the thorny issue—which has surfaced in at least the past three administrations—of the media's responsibility toward the public and government in reporting on delicate, often divisive intelligence and foreign policy matters in the administration. "I hear people yearning to go back to the good old days," Leahy said at a news briefing yesterday. "Well, the good old days are the Bay of Pigs and Salvador Allende and Patrice Lumumba and a lot of other failures."

Leahy told a news briefing that he was not accusing the CIA of "wanting to pull another Bay of Pigs," the aborted U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba in 1961, but he said that "when you had no congressional oversight" the agency had become embroiled in such adventures as attempts to poison Cuban leader

Fidel Castro, the bloody coup against leftist Chilean president Allende in 1973 and the support of murder plots against Lumumba, a leftist premier of what is now Zaire assassinated in 1961.

Leahy yesterday also supported Durenberger's charges that the administration was guilty of "selective leaking." The Vermont Democrat said the Reagan administration was "the worst ever" compared with those of presidents Gerald R. Ford or Jimmy Carter. He added that "there are a whole lot" of U.S. secrets that members of the intelligence committee learned of "first in the press."

The debate seems likely to persist, partly because of increasing CIA activity around the world under the Reagan administration and partly because Congress is sharply divided, though not strictly along party lines, on the issue of its oversight role of intelligence operations and the making of foreign policy.

The public exchanges this week have highlighted the sharp differences of opinion. Durenberger has said he wants to change "the definition of oversight" of intelligence operations and to "open that process up a little bit more so it isn't just their [the administration's] mistakes that become a problem."

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said he endorsed Durenberger's idea of a larger public debate on general intelligence policy but was leery of open discussions of operations that risk "damage being done to our interests."

The two most recent examples of the confidence crisis have been reporting on the short-lived defection of the Soviet KGB official, Vitaly Yurchenko, and an administration decision to authorize a CIA plan to seek to undermine the regime of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

Many administration officials were furious at a Nov. 3 front-page article in The Washington Post about the CIA plan to help Libya's neighbors or opponents topple Qaddafi; President Reagan has ordered an investigation of the disclosure. Hamilton said he regards it "as a very serious leak of a different magnitude than the others."

Several senior U.S. officials have questioned the wisdom of The Post's decision to publish the article, a decision that they say has compromised U.S. diplomacy and seriously embarrassed the opposition to Qaddafi and its Arab backers.

In response to the article, Egypt and Algeria—two neighboring states at odds with Qaddafi—have said they will have nothing to do with any CIA "plot" against another Arab leader. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the main Libyan group within the badly fragmented Libyan opposition, said in a statement from London that the article was "liable to discredit and undermine the genuine Libyan strength and preempt any national action that might be carried out against Qaddafi."

Leonard Downie Jr., managing editor of The Washington Post, in defending the newspaper's decision to publish the article, said the CIA plan was being "widely and hotly debated" inside the agency and between the CIA and the congressional committees responsible for oversight of such operations.

The debate was "significant," Downie said, and "the whole question of what kinds of covert operations the CIA should engage in is one suitable for public scrutiny."

Critics of the plan, he said, were even questioning whether the operation was "legal" because it might have ended in the assassination of Qaddafi, who has long been accused of supporting international terrorism. A longstanding executive order signed by Reagan forbids the CIA or any other U.S. agency from direct or indirect involvement in any assassination plan.

Continued

Downie said The Post article had disclosed no precise details of what the CIA was planning to do, "which we should not and did not do." He also said that the reporter involved, Bob Woodward, interviewed a number of knowledgeable government sources in reporting the article and that neither before nor after publication had any of them called to suggest that disclosure of the plan might endanger national security or U.S. lives.

Qaddafi has used the article to rally renewed support at home and in the Arab world for his embattled regime, picturing himself as a target of "the great American Satan," as one U.S. analyst put it.

The analyst was highly critical of any CIA anti-Qaddafi plan relying on Libyan opposition figures, describing them as "nobodies, klutzes and incompetents" lacking internal support.

In the Yurchenko situation, the defector, who returned to Moscow earlier this month after three months in CIA custody, has said that information leaked to the press about his defection had upset him and some observers have suggested that it may have affected his thinking about remaining in the United States.

Durenberger told a group of reporters Wednesday that he felt the CIA probably should have said less about Yurchenko, although he also acknowledged that the CIA feels

the same way about members of his committee.

In discussing the administration's "selective leaking" of secrets, Durenberger added, "All of you know that with regard to Central America in particular they have leaked classified information about arms flow at various times." This was apparently a reference to Soviet and Cuban arms shipments to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Ironically, many of the disclosures about Yurchenko's defection—the fact that he had defected, his alleged ranking as No. 5 in the KGB, and his alleged role in triggering other defections—were printed in the Italian press a month

or more before they surfaced in the United States.

As early as Aug. 8, the state-run Italian radio reported Yurchenko's disappearance in Rome and probable defection.

By Aug. 31, it was a front-page article in *Corriere della Sera* containing many of the details, assumptions and speculation about who he was that were to appear later in the American press.

*Corriere*, in its Sept. 1 edition, identified Yurchenko in a front-page article as "the No. 5 in the KGB," a sensational bit of news that took the U.S. media more than three weeks to report on the basis of "leaked" information here.



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE **11**NEW YORK TIMES  
16 November 1985

# Intelligence: The Times Are Touchy

By **STEPHEN ENGELBERG**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15 — The relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Congressional oversight committees has been, at best, a marriage of convenience, a clash of cultures never far from rancorous discord.

Intelligence officers view their successes and failures as matters of great secrecy, some of which must be hidden "from inception to eternity." Members of Congress, tending toward spirited public debate, are inclined to point out mistakes, sometimes none too gently, when a Government agency errs.

Congress sees itself as an open advocate of the people and a watchdog over agencies that spend the people's tax money. The C.I.A., by contrast, believes that Congress has gone beyond its oversight role and has begun exposing agency secrets to further political ends.

Both sides confirm that under the Reagan Administration, relations between Capitol Hill and the intelligence agencies have become so tense that the Administration has at times declined to undertake covert operations because Congressional disclosure was viewed as a virtual certainty.

## Casey's Open Letter

The inherent contradictions bound up by Congressional oversight burst into the open Thursday night when William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, said in an open letter that the process had gone "seriously awry."

To Mr. Casey, Congressional oversight has become characterized by "off the cuff" comments that damage morale and disclose intelligence sources.

"It is time to acknowledge," Mr. Casey wrote, "that the process has gone seriously awry." He added: "If the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers."

Senator Patrick Leahy, the deputy chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, called the Casey letter "unfortunate" and said today that it had inflamed an already delicate situation.

"On the one hand, you have the C.I.A. rejecting oversight," Mr. Leahy said. "And the Congress is saying, 'We'll get Casey for these comments.'"

Elected officials, to function as advocates for the public, say they must be permitted wide access to the inner workings of a secret agency that has been guilty of abuses. To Mr. Leahy, there is no support for a return to the "good old days" when, he said, the C.I.A., acting under little oversight,



Sygnia / Diego Goldberg  
**William J. Casey**



The New York Times  
**Senator Patrick Leahy**



The New York Times  
**Senator Dave Durenberger**

became involved in such failed operations as the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The issue was heightened this year when the leadership of the Senate intelligence committee changed, with Senator Dave Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, replacing Senator Barry Goldwater as chairman, and Senator Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, replacing Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan as deputy chairman.

From the beginning, both Senators Durenberger and Leahy said they favored greater public discussion of intelligence issues.

Accordingly, the committee staff has a press officer who responds to inquiries from journalists, and Mr. Durenberger and Mr. Leahy are fre-

received a secret briefing on an intelligence case.

Nevertheless, this year's ferment in the intelligence world has provided the Senators with plenty of grist for their preference for public debate.

For example, members of Congress have strenuously questioned the cases of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the reputed senior K.G.B. officer who reportedly had defected to the West, and of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who Mr. Yurchenko said had given the Russians important information about American intelligence gathering in Moscow.

Congressional criticism of the report about Mr. Howard had barely subsided when Mr. Yurchenko announced that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. Members of Congress were immediately critical of the C.I.A.'s dealings with Mr. Yurchenko. Some viewed him as a Soviet plant who fooled the agency, and others said he was emotionally overwrought and had changed his mind, perhaps because of mistakes by his handlers in the agency.

In another spy case, both House and Senate members have criticized Navy security procedures involving John A. Walker Jr. And both Congress and the Administration are trying to learn who disclosed that the C.I.A. had a plan to undermine the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, and that both intelligence committees had expressed reservations about it.

## A Requirement to Inform

Under laws passed in the 1970's after Congressional investigations of C.I.A. abuses, the Administration must inform Congress of any significant anticipated intelligence activity.

In a speech several months ago, Mr. Durenberger said the Reagan Administration had in several instances chosen not to initiate a covert action that was otherwise deemed to be appropriate because it could not trust Congress to keep it secret.

Indeed, he said, a lesser option was chosen. And Administration officials confirmed this assessment.

"The Administration," he told the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, "may prefer to do the wrong thing in secret, rather than doing the right thing in public."

## The oversight process cannot work 'on the front pages of American newspapers.'

*William J. Casey*

quently available for interviews and have discussed a wide range of intelligence issues. Indeed, Mr. Casey said his letter was prompted by public comments from Mr. Durenberger regarding the agency's performance.

By contrast, the Democrat-controlled House intelligence committee has been less public.

Its chairman, Representative Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana rarely criticizes the agency's performance in his press interviews.

According to members of the committee, Mr. Hamilton prefers to work out differences with the C.I.A. in private.

The committee staff seldom responds to even routine inquiries from the press. In one instance, top committee aides refused to return calls asking whether the committee had

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE B1NEW YORK TIMES  
15 November 1985

# Chief of C.I.A. Assails Congress Over Security

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, asserted tonight that comments by members of Congress had caused "the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

In a strongly worded letter to the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Casey contended that the Congressional oversight of intelligence agencies "has gone seriously awry." He said that some Congressional attacks on the agency's performance had been "inaccurate," "off the cuff" or "unfounded."

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency would not elaborate on what specific breaches of security might have been caused by members of Congress.

Mr. Casey's letter was released tonight after several weeks of mounting criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency by some members of Congress. The Congressmen have questioned the handling of the cases of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a Soviet intelligence officer, and of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer accused of spying for the Soviet Union.

Mr. Casey said his letter was prompted by newspaper accounts of criticism of the agency by the intelligence committee chairman, Dave Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican,

at a luncheon meeting with reporters on Wednesday.

Mr. Durenberger has asserted that he was misquoted in some accounts. But Mr. Casey's letter was clearly aimed at the broader issue of whether it was appropriate to have public discussion of certain sensitive issues overseen by the intelligence committees in the House and Senate.

Mr. Durenberger, in a letter to The Washington Post, said the newspaper had "done a great disservice" in its reporting of the luncheon. He said his comments were taken "entirely out of context" and he called the report by The Post "factually incorrect." Mr. Durenberger wrote. "As I am certain other correspondents at the press luncheon would agree, the thrust of my remarks was positive."

At the session, Mr. Durenberger praised Mr. Casey and the work of the agency.

A spokesman for Mr. Durenberger said tonight that he could not be reached immediately for comment.

Mr. Casey's letter makes reference to the account carried by The Post "and other newspapers."

Robert Kaiser, assistant managing editor/national news of The Post, said the account contained two errors which had been inserted by editors, but he said, "We stand by the thrust of the story."

Alluding to statements by Mr. Durenberger's staff that he had been misquoted, Mr. Casey wrote: "That is not the point. Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable. As we have discussed many times, if the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front page of American newspapers."

"The cost in compromised sources, damaged morale and the effect on overall capabilities is simply too high."

Mr. Durenberger and Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, have both argued for fuller public discussion of intelligence issues.

At a speech this year to the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Mr. Durenberger suggested that intelligence agencies sometimes used secrecy as a means of hiding embarrassing mistakes.

In his letter, Mr. Casey took particular issue with what he said were Mr. Durenberger's comments Wednesday to reporters that the agency had failed to understand the Soviet Union and had not produced long-range evaluations of such issues as the rise of Shiite fundamentalism, the insurgency in the Philippines, or the energy crisis.

Mr. Casey called this assertion "tragically wrong," saying, "These are all areas where the intelligence community has produced an enormous number of long-range studies over the last six years or more and where we have been far out front."

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL  
13 November 1985

SENATE INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN LAUDS CIA CHIEF  
BY BENJAMIN SHORE, COPELY NEWS SERVICE  
WASHINGTON

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WEDNESDAY CALLED CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM CASEY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, A "DARN GOOD GUY IN THAT JOB," DESPITE THE REDEFECTION OF A KGB OFFICIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION.

SEN. DAVE DURENBERGER, R-MINN., TOLD REPORTERS THAT CASEY "KNOWS THE (INTELLIGENCE) CRAFT AND THE POLITICS INVOLVED."

OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE SHARPLY CRITIZED CASEY AND THE CIA FOR LETTING VITALY YURCHENKO, ALLEGEDLY A TOP KGB OFFICIAL, SLIP AWAY FROM HIS CIA ESCORTS NOV. 2.

SOME CALLED FOR CASEY'S RESIGNATION AFTER YURCHENKO, DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY HERE, CLAIMED HE WAS KIDNAPPED, DRUGGED AND OTHERWISE MISTREATED BY THE CIA.

ON ANOTHER ISSUE, DURENBERGER SAID THE CIA HAS BEEN LAX IN PROVIDING LONG-RANGE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF SUCH EVOLVING ISSUES AS AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, PHILIPPINES UNREST AND GLOBAL ENERGY SUPPLIES.

WHILE THE CIA HAS PROFICIENT ANALYSTS, HE SAID, "THE PROCESS DOESN'T LET THEM LOOK FIVE YEARS DOWN THE ROAD..."

"WE MUST MOVE TO A STRATEGY FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: TO HELP GUIDE AMERICAN POLICY MAKERS, DURENBERGER SAID.

DURENBERGER SAID HIS COMMITTEE, WHICH, LIKE ITS HOUSE COUNTERPART, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CIA, IS AWAITING A REPORT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON WHY YURCHENKO DECIDED TO RETURN TO MOSCOW AFTER THREE MONTHS IN CIA CUSTODY.

"WE ALSO WANT TO KNOW WHERE THE BUCK STOPS" IN SUCH CASES, DURENBERGER SAID, REFERRING TO CRITISM THAT CIA OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CASEY, DID NOT HANDLE YURCHENKO WITH SENSITIVITY.

THE SENATOR SAID 50 PERCENT OF RUSSIAN OFFICIALS WHO DEFECT TO THE UNITED STATES RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF HOMESICKNESS, A HIGHER PERCENTAGE THAN ANY OTHER NATIONALITY.

BUT DURENBERGER, WHO SAID THE CIA TOLD HIM OF YURCHENKO'S DEFECTION TWO MONTHS AGO, SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHY THE CIA FAILED WITH YURCHENKO.

"THE MAIN HURT IS EMBARRASSMENT" TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, DURENBERGER SAID.

A CIA AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF THE CASE MAY RESULT IN CHANGES IN CIA POLICY TO ENCOURAGE MORE DEFECTIONS AS PART OF A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY, HE ADDED.

SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE EXPECTED TO PUBLICIZE YURCHENKO'S CASE TO DISCOURAGE INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER OFFICIALS FROM DEFECTING.

YURCHENKO CLAIMED THAT THE REASON HE DECIDED TO REDEFECT WAS THE PUBLICITY THAT HE CLAIMED THE CIA HAD BEGUN GENERATING ABOUT THE SECRETS HE WAS REVEALING.

SOURCES HAVE SAID THAT YURCHENKO HAD HOPED TO LIVE IN OBSCURITY IN THE UNITED STATES.

DURENBERGER SAID THAT WHILE THE CIA "PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE SAID LESS ABOUT HAVING YURCHENKO, 'PUBLICITY OF SOME U.S. INTELLIGENCE COUPS WOULD LEAD THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TO FORGIVE SOME MISTAKES."

IN DEFENDING CASEY, DURENBERGER SAID THE 72 YEAR OLD FORMER LAWYER, BUSINESSMAN, WORLD WAR II SPY, AUTHOR AND POLITICIAN APPOINTED TO THE CIA POST BY MR. REAGAN IN 1981 HAD "MATURED" IN THE JOB.

CASEY NO LONGER BELIEVES THE CIA SHOULD BE MAKING POLICY, DURENBERGER SAID, REFERRING TO RECENT CIA ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AS A EXAMPLE. "HE NOW KNOWS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY," DURENBERGER SAID.

ARTICLE APPROVED  
ON PAGE 8 (Part I)

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
14 November 1985

## Panel Likely to Seek to Reduce Casey's Policy-Setting Role

Proposal Would Dilute CIA Director's White House Influence and Broaden Powers of McFarlane

By MICHAEL WINES, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—The Senate Intelligence Committee is likely to recommend next year that President Reagan reduce the CIA director's role in setting policy and instead limit his duties to "professional intelligence work," Sen. Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.), the committee chairman, said Wednesday.

In a lengthy luncheon session with reporters, Durenberger suggested that the job of recommending policy changes such as secret operations against other governments should rest with the President's national security adviser, while the director of central intelligence should carry out the changes.

The proposal apparently would dilute the White House role of Reagan's close friend and political strategist, CIA Director William J. Casey, and broaden the powers of National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane. It was revealed against a background of growing criticism of the way top CIA officials handled Vitaly Yurchenko, the Soviet KGB officer whose much-touted defection to CIA hands embarrassingly backfired last week.

"One of the things we ought to be sorting out," Durenberger said, "is whether or not maybe effectively in the present situation, McFarlane shouldn't be the President's right hand on intelligence input through policy and Casey ought to be the pro who runs the organization."

Although the senator said that Casey had sought to make the CIA a policy-setting agency early in his tenure—citing the agency's advocacy of top-secret operations in Central America such as the mining of Nicaraguan harbors—he added that Casey has "matured" in the top CIA post and strongly praised his management of the organization.

A Senate intelligence aide downplayed the thrust of Durenberger's remarks late Wednesday, saying the committee does not intend to recommend that the President shift any of Casey's current duties to McFarlane. Instead, he said, the panel hopes only to force McFarlane and other "consumers" of the

CIA's intelligence to specify their needs so that the intelligence agency knows what type of information to gather.

The aide said that Casey occasionally "may give some personal advice to the President" but exercises no major policy powers. The Senate panel's proposal envisions "no fundamental role change, just an exercise over the reinvigoration of the way the system should be operating," he said.

Durenberger's proposal, he said, calls for "more clarification of the current responsibilities" of the CIA director and policy-makers "and acceptance on both sides of those responsibilities."

"It's not that Bill Casey doesn't do that now, but it's not done in a very well organized and orchestrated way," he said. He said the proposal has been in the works for several months and is unrelated to criticism of the agency stemming from the Yurchenko affair.

However, Durenberger's remarks appeared to suggest a lessening of the White House role now played by Casey, the only director of central intelligence to hold a post in a President's Cabinet.

Casey, widely regarded as the most powerful intelligence chief since the post was created in 1947, is credited by some with helping devise the Reagan Administration's strategy of covert operations against Nicaragua and in support of struggling Central American nations on its borders.

Durenberger strongly praised Casey's "professionalism" and said that he is responsible for a general improvement in the agency's morale.

"I'm giving him a plus on the job, despite all the things I've got to swallow ... to do that," he said.

However, some senators on the intelligence panel believe "that the national security adviser to the President ought to really be the person responsible ... for the linkage between intelligence and policy, and the (director of central intelligence) ought to be a person who does professional intelligence work."

Some intelligence experts said Wednesday that the adoption of

Durenberger's proposal might have little effect on either Casey or federal intelligence policy, partly because Casey's central role in White House intelligence affairs is based on his close personal links to Reagan.

Additionally, the director of central intelligence—who not only heads the CIA but also oversees some duties of the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency—has budgetary and advisory powers that could not be diluted without Congress's permission. And Durenberger suggested no changes in law.

While Durenberger did not directly criticize Casey on Wednesday, he voiced concern about the agency's performance in some key areas, including intelligence assessments of the Soviet Union and South Africa.

He also sharply criticized the agency's assessments of the future of the South Africa government, saying there is a "vacuum" of independent and unbiased information about the country's problems.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C-11

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
14 November 1985

## Casey wouldn't bat?



**Casey's staying  
at CIA.**

Have the skids been greased for CIA Director William Casey because of the way his agency handled the flap over on-again, off-again Russian defector Vitaly Yurchenko? No way, says Sen. David Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Durenberger said over lunch with insiders in Washington's Ritz-Carlton yesterday that Casey, a former New York lawyer and GOP fund-raiser, will keep his post with White House approval.

"He's as good a CIA director as we have ever had," said Durenberger, but added with a grin, "and that forgives a lot of things." With tongue in cheek, Durenberger said if Casey's case came up for a confidence vote before his 15-member committee, the senators would vote Republicans 8, Democrats 7.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A19NEW YORK TIMES  
14 November 1985

## Casey Is Reported to Fault C.I.A. For Its Disclosures on Yurchenko

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, has said the C.I.A. gave Congress too much information about the defection of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said today.

Senator Dave Durenberger, the chairman, quoted Mr. Casey as telling the committee recently: "We shouldn't have told you guys as much as we did."

Some members of Congress, such as Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, have criticized the agency for allowing publicity about Mr. Yurchenko's defection, which Administration officials initially portrayed as an intelligence coup.

"The proposition is very simple," said Senator Moynihan, former Vice Chairman of the Senate committee. "The successes of diplomacy and intelligence are events that just don't happen." Noting that the State Department at one point issued a statement that described Mr. Yurchenko's rank in the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency, he said, "this was just self-promotion."

At a luncheon meeting with reporters, Mr. Durenberger also said that about 50 percent of the people who defect to the United States return to their homeland.

Mr. Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican, is one of several members of Congress and former intelligence officials who have been questioning the C.I.A.'s procedures for defectors as the Reagan Administration begins to examine why Mr. Yurchenko returned to the Soviet Union.

Last week, after three months in the hands of the C.I.A., Mr. Yurchenko appeared at a press conference to an-

nounce that he had been kidnapped and drugged, charges the State Department quickly denied.

"From what we've learned about defectors," said Mr. Durenberger, "50 percent go home in a relatively short period of time. In this case, there are some questions about whether he was handled right."

Mr. Durenberger said the C.I.A. has ordered its inspector general to prepare a report on the case, and that the inspector general will be looking into the agency's handling of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who has been accused of helping Soviet intelligence identify American agents in Moscow.

A committee spokesman said the F.B.I. will also be asked to prepare a written report on its handling of Mr. Yurchenko.

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WASHINGTON POST  
 17 November 1985

## —The CIA and Its Critics—

*Last week, it was reported that Sen. Dave Durenberger had criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William Casey. Mr. Casey responded with an open letter to the senator. We asked the senator for his reaction. We print it below, along with the text of the Casey letter.*

*Dave Durenberger*

### The Public Must Know That It Works

Careful reflection on the content of CIA Director William Casey's open letter to me as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee raises a very troubling issue for the American people. Casey's clear message is that, independent of the factual accuracy or inaccuracy of the Post article [Nov. 14] concerning my comments on the CIA, public criticism of the performance of the CIA compromises sources, damages morale and undermines our overall intelligence capability.

In Casey's view, the cost of public discussion is simply too high, and therefore the public has no right to know how effectively the CIA does its job as part of the oversight process. Quite the contrary, he feels that oversight must be confined to discussion between the Intelligence Committee and the director behind the closed doors of our hearing room. Otherwise, we are told, there is repeated compromise of sources and methods.

Clearly, we all oppose the irresponsible use of one's knowledge of intelligence. Disclosure of certain facts can reveal the source of those facts. Careful, formal procedures must be followed in disclosing classified information. Discussion of any intelligence matters for political support or personal publicity is irresponsible. The Intelligence Committee is the first to condemn such public discussions, whether they occur in Congress or in the administration.

But public discussion of intelligence does not necessarily mean disclosure of sensitive sources and methods.

There is no question that all public officials—in Congress as well as in the executive branch—who are provided sensitive intelligence bear a heavy burden. Their public statements on any foreign policy, economic or national security issue about which they have special knowledge must be delicately constructed to protect that information.

But this is not to say that those who have this information cannot or should not speak out on these issues. Intelligence is no exception. It is a subject of public knowledge and public discussion.

should, speak openly on the subject of intelligence, as Casey did recently in Time magazine on terrorism and intelligence, without compromising security.

The real issue with Casey is not that there were public statements, but that those statements were reported as critical. Casey would not have written that letter if the headline had been "CIA, Casey Praised by Hill Chairman." Public praise of the operations or analytical product evokes no public condemnation or charges of compromising sources and methods.

In short, the head of the U.S. intelligence community does not feel that the intelligence agencies should be accountable to the American people. It is exactly this attitude that has led to the past abuses and resulted in the institution of the oversight process within Congress. Whether Casey likes it or not, the public does hold the CIA accountable and the public must know the oversight process works.

It is encouraging to hear that Casey is pleased with the intelligence product and is satisfied with his long-range planning process. We on the Intelligence Committee have had many good things to say both publicly and privately on both of these subjects. Nevertheless, we also have concerns in both areas—concerns that are not the result of "off-the cuff," unsubstantiated conclusions. They are concerns based on four months of testimony before our committee by the policy makers and military officers who use national intelligence.

Intelligence is not an end in itself whose usefulness is based on self-evaluation. The ultimate judgment must rest with those who use the product. National intelligence is a service organization, and the director should welcome constructive comments designed to improve that service.

The intelligence agencies are also accountable for the conduct of their operations. They cannot simply invoke "sources and methods" to make Congress remain silent in the face of extensive public discussion—often fueled by executive branch disclosures—of allegations of mismanagement, as in both the Edward Lee Howard and Vitaly Yurchenko cases. If the American people are to know that the oversight process is working, they must be kept informed. Indeed, when one stifles the disclosure of things that can safely be said in public, the result is often an outpouring of leaks that are infinitely more damaging to U.S. intelligence than is a bit of criticism.

Although the Intelligence Committee does much in complete secrecy, we also speak publicly. We do it when necessary. When we do, we are careful in our statements, measured in our criticism, generous in our praise, protective of sensitive information but mindful of our responsibility to the American people. We intend to continue this policy.

*The writer, a Republican senator from Minnesota, is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.*





ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE **11A**NEW YORK TIMES  
16 November 1985

# Intelligence: The Times Are Touchy

By **STEPHEN ENGELBERG**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15 — The relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Congressional oversight committees has been, at best, a marriage of convenience, a clash of cultures never far from rancorous discord.

Intelligence officers view their successes and failures as matters of great secrecy, some of which must be hidden "from inception to eternity." Members of Congress, tending toward spirited public debate, are inclined to point out mistakes, sometimes none too gently, when a Government agency errs.

Congress sees itself as an open advocate of the people and a watchdog over agencies that spend the people's tax money. The C.I.A., by contrast, believes that Congress has gone beyond its oversight role and has begun exposing agency secrets to further political ends.

Both sides confirm that under the Reagan Administration, relations between Capitol Hill and the intelligence agencies have become so tense that the Administration has at times declined to undertake covert operations because Congressional disclosure was viewed as a virtual certainty.

## Casey's Open Letter

The inherent contradictions bound up by Congressional oversight burst into the open Thursday night when William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, said in an open letter that the process had gone "seriously awry."

To Mr. Casey, Congressional oversight has become characterized by "off the cuff" comments that damage morale and disclose intelligence sources.

"It is time to acknowledge," Mr. Casey wrote, "that the process has gone seriously awry." He added: "If the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers."

Senator Patrick Leahy, the deputy chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, called the Casey letter "unfortunate" and said today that it had inflamed an already delicate situation.

"On the one hand, you have the C.I.A. rejecting oversight," Mr. Leahy said. "And the Congress is saying, 'We'll get Casey for these comments.'"

Elected officials, to function as advocates for the public, say they must be permitted wide access to the inner workings of a secret agency that has been guilty of abuses. To Mr. Leahy, there is no support for a return to the "good old days" when, he said, the C.I.A., acting under little oversight,



Sygnia / Diego Goldberg  
**William J. Casey**



The New York Times  
**Senator Patrick Leahy**



The New York Times  
**Senator Dave Durenberger**

became involved in such failed operations as the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The issue was heightened this year when the leadership of the Senate intelligence committee changed, with Senator Dave Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, replacing Senator Barry Goldwater as chairman, and Senator Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, replacing Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan as deputy chairman.

From the beginning, both Senators Durenberger and Leahy said they favored greater public discussion of intelligence issues.

Accordingly, the committee staff has a press officer who responds to inquiries from journalists, and Mr. Durenberger and Mr. Leahy are fre-

received a secret briefing on an intelligence case.

Nevertheless, this year's ferment in the intelligence world has provided the Senators with plenty of grist for their preference for public debate.

For example, members of Congress have strenuously questioned the cases of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the reputed senior K.G.B. officer who reportedly had defected to the West, and of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who Mr. Yurchenko said had given the Russians important information about American intelligence gathering in Moscow.

Congressional criticism of the report about Mr. Howard had barely subsided when Mr. Yurchenko announced that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. Members of Congress were immediately critical of the C.I.A.'s dealings with Mr. Yurchenko. Some viewed him as a Soviet plant who fooled the agency, and others said he was emotionally overwrought and had changed his mind, perhaps because of mistakes by his handlers in the agency.

In another spy case, both House and Senate members have criticized Navy security procedures involving John A. Walker Jr. And both Congress and the Administration are trying to learn who disclosed that the C.I.A. had a plan to undermine the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, and that both intelligence committees had expressed reservations about it.

## A Requirement to Inform

Under laws passed in the 1970's after Congressional investigations of C.I.A. abuses, the Administration must inform Congress of any significant anticipated intelligence activity.

In a speech several months ago, Mr. Durenberger said the Reagan Administration had in several instances chosen not to initiate a covert action that was otherwise deemed to be appropriate because it could not trust Congress to keep it secret.

Indeed, he said, a lesser option was chosen. And Administration officials confirmed this assessment.

"The Administration," he told the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, "may prefer to do the wrong thing in secret, rather than doing the right thing in public."

**The oversight process cannot work 'on the front pages of American newspapers.'**

*William J. Casey*

quently available for interviews and have discussed a wide range of intelligence issues. Indeed, Mr. Casey said his letter was prompted by public comments from Mr. Durenberger regarding the agency's performance.

By contrast, the Democrat-controlled House intelligence committee has been less public.

Its chairman, Representative Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana rarely criticizes the agency's performance in his press interviews.

According to members of the committee, Mr. Hamilton prefers to work out differences with the C.I.A. in private.

The committee staff seldom responds to even routine inquiries from the press. In one instance, top committee aides refused to return calls asking whether the committee had

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
 16 November 1985

# CIA's Casey is assailed as foe of Congress' scrutiny

By James McGregor  
 Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The continuing spat between CIA director William J. Casey and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence went public again yesterday as Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D., Vt.), the panel's vice chairman, accused Casey of wanting to "return to the good old days" when there was no congressional oversight of the CIA.

In an unusual move Thursday, Casey had released the contents of a letter he had sent to committee chairman David Durenberger (R., Minn.). In it, he asserted that Durenberger's "off the cuff" public comments about intelligence matters had led to "the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

Though Casey cited no examples, he is known to believe that "the Hill [Congress] leaks everything" about sensitive or covert intelligence operations.

The CIA director also accused Durenberger of undercutting the morale of CIA officers around the world and added:

"It is time to acknowledge that the [congressional oversight] process has gone seriously awry."

Casey was apparently irritated by an account in the Washington Post of a luncheon meeting Durenberger had with reporters on Wednesday. The paper said the senator — alternately criticizing and praising Casey — alleged that the CIA lacked "a sense of direction" and an adequate knowledge of long-range trends in the Soviet Union.

Among Durenberger's chief criticisms of the agency's leadership, the Post said, was an allegation that CIA analysts "aren't being told what it is we need [to know] about the Soviet Union." He also criticized the agency's assessment of the South African situation, saying there was a "vacuum" of independent information and that the agency was relying too heavily on State Department views, the Post reported.

Yesterday, Durenberger left it to Leahy to respond to Casey's criticism.

"It does not help the process if the director of the CIA wants to publicly say in effect that we shouldn't have

an oversight procedure, and that is what he is saying," Leahy said. "... If the intelligence agencies could be sure they could do away with congressional oversight, they could always use secrecy to hide their mistakes."

In defense of his colleague, Leahy said: "I think Sen. Durenberger has been very, very supportive of a strong and effective intelligence service in this country. ... I think it is unfortunate for the director of the CIA to attack him and imply otherwise."

CIA spokesman George Lauder said the agency would have no comment on Leahy's remarks or Casey's letter.

Durenberger's aides termed the dispute a tempest in a teapot stemming from an inaccuracy in the Post's report of Durenberger's Wednesday remarks. The newspaper said yesterday that it "incorrectly quoted" Durenberger as saying he would recommend legislation to restrict the CIA director to professional intelligence work with no policy-making role.

In a letter Thursday to the Post, Durenberger said that the article

tee" because "statements of mine were used entirely out of context."

Ever since he rated Casey "2 on a scale of 10" last year, Durenberger has muted his criticism of the CIA director. In March, he said that his opinion of Casey had improved because "Bill is now doing what he is told."

*"It does not help the process if the director of the CIA wants to publicly say in effect that we shouldn't have an oversight procedure, and that is what he is saying," Leahy said. "... If the intelligence agencies could be sure they could do away with congressional oversight, they could always use secrecy to hide their mistakes."*

On Wednesday, Durenberger said Casey was a "professional" and "a darn good guy in that job."

Leahy said that he believed Casey's sharply worded letter was an "over-reaction" that reflected the bruising of the CIA director's ego as a result of the case of Vitaly Yurchenko, a top KGB operative who defected to the United States in August but returned home last week.

"I got the impression that he is not a happy man, period," Leahy said about Casey.

This week's episode followed earlier disputes between Casey and Congress over Casey's reluctance to keep House and Senate oversight committees informed of agency operations, such as the mining of harbors in Nicaragua and the alleged training of counterterrorists in the Middle East.



William J. Casey  
 Sensitive to leaks

created the mistaken impression of "deep, irreconcilable differences between the director and the commit-

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1ABALTIMORE SUN  
18 November 1985

# On Casey's Watch

The vice-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee says Director of Central Intelligence William Casey runs the best intelligence service in the world. The chairman of the committee says Mr. Casey is "a pro" who is doing a good job. But Chairman David Durenberger (R. Minn.) and Patrick Leahy (D. Vt.) know there is something wrong at the Central Intelligence Agency, something the director has to take responsibility for. Mr. Durenberger's question, "Where does the buck stop?" can have only one answer. As Senator Leahy said, "This happened on [Casey's] watch."

Typically, Mr. Casey ignores the compliments and charges publicly that Mr. Durenberger shouldn't talk about him and the agency in public — and further charges that the Senate committee leaks important secrets. It does leak at times, but Senator Leahy is convincing when he says that most leaked intelligence secrets are information the committee hasn't heard about yet.

The controversy over the CIA's handling of the Russian KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko touched off the Casey-Durenberger fireworks. By letting him walk away from an agent and into the Soviet embassy in Washington, there to charge he was abducted and abused, the CIA has embarrassed itself and the nation. This case strengthens those Casey critics who say he has been so concerned with other aspects of the CIA's mission that the important business of gaining important informa-

tion through such human resources as defectors has suffered.

Mr. Casey has other shortcomings. He does not seem to understand or accept congressional oversight responsibility, as he shows with his response to Mr. Durenberger. And as both an ideologue and a partisan (President Reagan's campaign director in 1980), he has on occasion seemed to let policy affect intelligence. The other way around is, of course, the way it has to be.

Even Mr. Casey's detractors would give him high marks for restoring morale in the CIA, by increasing its budget, adding needed expertise — and by taking its (and his) critics head on. That is sometimes unwise, especially in the present instance, but it does buck up the troops. Mr. Casey has also boosted morale by staying on the job. One reason for the blues at the CIA when Mr. Casey took over was that there had been so much turnover at the top in the previous dozen years. We don't believe the director of intelligence ought to be a long-serving careerist, but stability is helpful.

Mr. Casey aside, the Yurchenko episode and other recent embarrassments, such as the disappearance and presumed defection of a CIA agent, have given the public cause for concern, which in turn makes this a good time for the intelligence committees on the Hill to take a good hard look at what has — and hasn't — happened in the world of intelligence in the past five years.